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. Foreign Investment*
The most significant foreign investment event in 2010 is the Canadian government's
refusal to allow BHP Billiton's proposed acquisition of Potash Corporation of Saskatche-
wan ("PotashCorp"). This action marks only the second rejection of a proposed transac-
tion outside of the cultural sector in the twenty-five year history of the Investment Canada
Act (ICA).
Apart from this decision, there has been a lack of action with respect to the 2009
amendments to the ICA, especially with respect to the review threshold of direct control
acquisitions, the treatment of state-owned enterprise investors, and the national security
review process for foreign investors. There has been, however, some activity in the ongo-
ing lawsuit against U.S. Steel for its alleged failure to comply with undertakings.
A. REJECTION OF BHP BILLITON'S PROPOSED AcQuIsrrION OF POTASH
CORPORATION
The federal Industry Minister ("Minister") rejected BHP Billiton's bid for PotashCorp
because it did not meet the "net benefit to Canada" test under the ICA. In general, the
evaluation of this standard involves economic considerations (e.g., the impact of the pro-
posed investment on employment, capital expenditures, head office location, participation
of Canadians in senior management, etc.) and the industrial and economic policy objec-
tives of a province likely to be affected significantly by the investment. It is a relatively
subjective process, and the Minister has very broad discretion. Moreover, there is very
little interpretive history on this standard.'
* Written by Sandra Walker, Partner at Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP.
1. The first transaction to be rejected was the 2008 proposed acquisition by a U.S. company, Alliant
Techsytems, of the geospatial business of MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. for (broadly speaking)
"national interest" reasons, among other rationales reported such as the protection of Canadian sovereignty
in the Arctic under the "net benefit" test.
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The Minister's decision is regarded as a political response to the public relations cam-
paign led by the Premier of Saskatchewan (the province in which most of PotashCorp's
mines are located) that galvanized popular opposition to the deal. For example, there has
been considerable discussion of potash as a "strategic resource," including by at least one
member of the federal cabinet.2 There also appears to be an inconsistency in the facts. As
the basis for his decision, the Minister questioned whether BHP Billiton was prepared to
make sufficient commitments with respect to capital expenditures and whether BHP Billi-
ton had sufficient expertise in mining and marketing potash.3 He also noted that
PotashCorp is a member of Canpotex, the potash export-marketing firm.4 Nevertheless,
when BHP Billiton withdrew its application on November 14, 2010, it made public its
proposed undertakings to the Canadian government; they appeared extensive and unprec-
edented in certain respects.
The international investment community will be listening attentively as the Minister
provides more clarity on how, if at all, BHP Billiton has affected the Minister's review of
future investments, especially as to prospects for future investments in other resource sec-
tors such as oil and gas and perhaps in Canadian icons (e.g., Research In Motion). The
government has been seen as a strong supporter of foreign investment in the past and will
undoubtedly wish to promote itself as welcoming of foreign capital.
B. REViEw THRESHOLD
A key change in the 2009 ICA amendments was that the threshold for review of direct
acquisitions of control by WTO-member based investors was to increase from the 2009s
level of C$312 million in book value of assets of the Canadian business to C$600 million
in "enterprise value" ("EV") for the two years following the implementation of regula-
tions.6 In all likelihood, this amendment will decrease the number of transactions that will
be subject to review; however, the government has still not promulgated final regulations.
It is unclear why the government has delayed in promulgating regulations to implement
the higher EV review threshold, but foreign investors should welcome regulations that
offer certainty and emphasize the overall value of the target enterprise.
C. TREATMENT OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE INVESTORS
Despite issuing guidelines three years ago regarding additional criteria the Canadian
government will consider in reviewing investments by state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"),
Canada has not to date taken a restrictive stance towards state-owned investment. The
warming of Canada's relations with China in 2009, coupled with the economic recession
(and the consequently higher demand for investment capital) and a softening of concerns
2. Eric Reguly, Andy Hoffman & Brenda Bouw, BHP's Hopes Fade as Ottawa Calls Potash 'Strategic,' THE
GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 5, 2010, at B1.
3. See Jeffrey Hodgson, BHP Potash Inexperience Weighed Against Bid-Canada, REUTERS, Nov. 14, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1421378920101115.
4. See Cassandra Kyle, BHP Billiton Withdraws Potash Bid, Citing 'Net-Benefit' Bar, POSTMEDLA NEWS,
Nov. 15, 2010, http://www.canada.com/news/Billiton+withdraws+potash+citing+benefit/3827505/story.html.
5. The review threshold for 2010 is only C$299 million due to deflation.
6. The amount would then be increased to C$800 million for the two years following, and to C$1 billion
for the following two years, to be indexed according to inflation thereafter.
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globally about SOEs7 may all be factors underlying the government's reticence to restrict
foreign investment by SOEs. Indeed, the Canadian government has not prohibited any
major SOE investments since the introduction of the SOE Guidelines. These approvals
confirm that the government is not inherently hostile to state-owned acquirers. In addi-
tion, it is clear that the government does not automatically presume that SOE investments
raise national security concerns. Both of these developments should comfort SOEs seek-
ing to invest in Canada.
D. NATIONAL SECURITY
The new national security screening process introduced in 2009 has generated some
anxiety among foreign investors, but, in fact, the government has not yet prohibited a
transaction on national security groundsY It seems likely that the current government's
interpretation of "national security" will be more circumscribed than the broad range of
industries potentially subject to review under the U.S. CFIUS process. That said, over
the past few years Canadian politicians of all political stripes, both provincial and federal,
have become acutely aware of the potential to use the ICA for political purposes, as is
evident from the BHP Billiton transaction. At some future time, "national security" con-
cerns might be used to justify review of a transaction that is unpopular and not otherwise
reviewable. Indeed, there is no review threshold for national security purposes.
E. LrrlGATION FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH UNDERTAKINGS
In July 2009, the federal government commenced suit against US Steel for failure to
comply with undertakings given in the context of US Steel's acquisition of Stelco in 2007.
The suit is still ongoing. As reported in last year's Year-in-Review, this lawsuit to enforce
undertakings is the first in the history of the ICA and alleges that US Steel failed to
comply with its commitments relating to employment and production at its Canadian
facilities.9 The Canadian government has requested that the court impose a fine of
C$10,000 per day for the alleged breach of the undertakings. In response, US Steel has
taken the position that it has not breached its undertakings, and its inability to meet the
undertakings was a result of factors beyond its control: a type of "force majeure" that
Industry Canada has accepted frequently in the past to excuse non-compliance with
undertakings.
One new development is that US Steel's efforts to have the ICA provision providing for
enforcement of undertakings declared unconstitutional did not succeed. On June 14,
7. This may be due in part to the collective efforts of organizations such as the International Monetary
Fund and the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds to instil greater comfort with SWFs
among host states through enhanced transparency and better governance. See generally SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS, GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRiNCIPLES AND PRACTIcES-SANTIAGo PRINCIPLEs, http://www.iwg-swf.
org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
8. It should be noted that Industry Canada intervened in 2009 on national security grounds in a proposed
transaction involving the purchase by a Belgian company of a Canadian company, Forsys Metals Corporation,
whose only asset was a uranium project in Namibia. The parties were advised by Industry Canada not to
close pending further notice. The parties ultimately abandoned the transaction, and it is unclear whether a
national security review was ever initiated.
9. John W. Boscariol, et al., Regional and Comparative Law: Canada, 44 Irr'L LAw. 613, 615 (2010).
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2010, the Federal Court of Canada found that the potential monetary penalty was not
penal in nature; rather its purpose was to promote the legislative goals of the ICA. Ac-
cordingly, Section II of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides
protections to persons charged with an offense, did not apply.
F. CONCLUSION
Until the Industry Minister's rejection of the BHP Billiton decision, Canada's foreign
investment review process was following a relatively routine course with the recent
amendments to the ICA having little impact. The review threshold is still unchanged, and
screening of investments on national security grounds has not been used as a protectionist
measure. The BHP Billiton decision has generated intense public debate about whether
Canada should view its natural resources as strategic assets that should remain Canadian-
controlled and the Minister's guidance on future transactions hopefully will offer some




In March 2009, Canada's federal government passed legislation to make far-reaching
amendments to Canada's Competition Act (the "Act")," including the Act's conspiracy
offense. But, implementation of the amendments to the Act's conspiracy offense was
delayed until March 12, 2010.
The new conspiracy offense applies to all conduct ongoing at or initiated after March
12, 2010, and makes it a per se criminal offense for competitors to enter into agreements
that: (i) fix, maintain, increase, or control the price for the supply of a product, (ii) allocate
sales, territories, customers, or markets for the production or supply of a product; or (iii)
fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen, or eliminate the production or supply of a product.
Maximum penalties under the new offense are fourteen years imprisonment and a C$25
million fine per count, up from the previous maximums of five years and C$10 million per
count.12
Unlike the previous (and now repealed) version of the offense, "the new conspiracy of-
fense does not require proof that the agreement, if implemented, would prevent or lessen
competition unduly."s3 The elimination of the requirement to prove market impact rep-
resents a fundamental shift in the nature of Canada's conspiracy offense and is intended to
make it easier for the authorities to prosecute cartel activity in and affecting Canada.
10. Canadian shareholders of Canadian corporations also will want to know that the value of their holdings
will not be limited by the fact that only Canadian companies are permitted to take over their respective
companes.
* Written by Mark Katz, Vice-Chair, ABA Canada Committee and Partner at Davies Ward Phillips &
Vmeberg LLP and Jim Dinning, Associate at Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP.
11. Bill C-10, Budget Implementation Act, 2009, 2d Sess. 40th Parl. (2009) (Can.).
12. Id.
13. Jim Dinning & Mark Katz, Canada: Cartels, GLOBAL COMPETITION (2010) available at http://www.
globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/25/sections/90/chapters/941/canada-cartels/.
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Some of the prior defenses, including those available if the agreement or arrangement
related to the exchange of statistics or credit information, cooperation in research and
development, or defining product standards, are no longer available under the new offense.
Other exceptions remain, including those for agreements between affiliates and agree-
ments relating only to exports of products from Canada.
Additionally, liability can be avoided under the new conspiracy offense if it can be estab-
lished that: (i) the impugned agreement is ancillary to a broader or separate agreement
that includes the same parties; (ii) the impugned agreement is directly related to, and
reasonably necessary for giving effect to, the objective of that broader or separate agree-
ment; and (iii) the broader or separate agreement, considered alone, does not contravene
the conspiracy offense.
In addition to the new criminal offense, the Act now contains a new civil provision that
applies to agreements between competitors that are not caught by the per se offense but
have the effect of substantially lessening or preventing competition. Applications under
this new provision are brought by the Commissioner of Competition ("Commissioner") to
the Competition Tribunal ("Tribunal"); private applications are not permitted. Relief is
limited to an order requiring the parties to cease engaging in the impugned conduct or, on
consent, to taking any other action. The new civil provision includes an "efficiencies"
defense that can be relied upon if the agreement has brought about or is likely to bring
about gains in efficiency, and these gains will be greater than and will offset the effects of
any prevention or lessening of competition that will result or is likely to result from the
agreement.
B. ADMInSTIATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In September 2010, the Competition Bureau ("Bureau") published an information bul-
letin on its leniency program ("Leniency Bulletin").14 The Leniency Bulletin details the
Bureau's approach to recommending reductions in penalty ("leniency") for participants in
cartel offenses who plead guilty and cooperate with the Bureau and the federal prosecutors,
the Public Prosecution Service of Canada ("PPSC").15 According to the Bulletin, the Bu-
reau will recommend leniency if the PPSC has not yet filed criminal charges against the
party, and the party has terminated its participation in the illegal activity, cooperates with
the Bureau's investigation and any subsequent prosecution, and admits guilt. The timeli-
ness of the party's cooperation and the value of the evidence offered will be important
considerations in determining the level of reduction. The first party eligible for a leniency
recommendation generally will receive a reduction of up to fifty percent of the fine that
otherwise would have been recommended; the second applicant is reduced up to thirty
percent. Subsequent applicants also may receive reductions to the fine that would have
otherwise been recommended.
14. Competition Bureau, Leniency Pavgram (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.
ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03288.html.
15. The Bureau investigates alleged criminal violations of the Act. Prosecutions are the responsibility of
the PPSC, upon referral by the Bureau. The PPSC has independent discretion to accept or to reject the
Bureau's recommendations, including with respect to sentencing and leniency. See id.
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C. MERGERS
In September 2010, the Bureau announced that it would hold a series of roundtables to
explore the merits of revising its Merger Enforcement Guidelines ("MEGs").16 The
MEGs, issued in 2004, provide general guidance on the Bureau's analytical approach to
merger review.1 7 The roundtables will seek to assess whether the MEGs accurately reflect
current Bureau practice and the potential impact of the revised Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines recently released by antitrust authorities in the United States.
D. CARTELS
In July 2010, the Bureau announced that criminal charges had been laid against twenty-
five individuals and three companies accused of fixing the price of retail gasoline in the
province of Quebec. 18 These charges follow charges initially laid in June 2008 and bring
the total number of accused to thirty-eight individuals and fourteen companies. To date,
ten individuals and six companies have pled guilty in this case, with fines totaling over
C$2.7 million. Of the ten individuals who have pled guilty, "six have been sentenced to
terms of imprisonment totaling fifty-four months," which is a sign of the Bureau's com-
mitment to securing sanctions against individuals wherever possible.19
E. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
In February 2010, the Commissioner filed a notice of application with the Tribunal
alleging that the Canadian Real Estate Association ("CREA"), a trade association repre-
senting almost 100,000 real estate agents, had abused its dominant position in the market
for residential real estate brokerage services throughout Canada.20 The Commissioner's
application sought to strike down rules that "limit consumer choice and prevent innova-
tion in the market for residential real estate services."2 1 However, on September 30, 2010,
the Bureau announced that it had reached an agreement in principle with CREA to settle
16. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau to Consult on Merger Enforcement Guide-
lines (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03284.html.
17. Competition Bureau, Merger Enforcement Guidelines (Sept. 1, 2004), available at http://www.competition
bureau.g.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01245.html.
18. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Criminal Charges Laid by Competition Bureau in Gas Price-Fix-
ing Case (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eicisite/cb-bc.nsfleng/03262.hmil.
19. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Tenth Individual Sentenced in Quebec Price-Fixing Cartel (Dec. 7,
2009), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03168.html.
20. Comm'r of Competition v. Canadian Real Estate Ass'n, CT-2010-002, (Competition Trib. Feb. 8,
2010) (Can.), available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2010-002_Notice%20of%20Application-l_45
2-8-2010_2541.pdf.
21. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Seeks to Prohibit Anti-competitive Real Es-
tate Rules (Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/sitecb-bc.nsf/eng/03196.html.
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its application. 22 The settlement is intended to provide consumers a greater "ability to
choose which services they want from a real estate agent when selling their home." 23
F. CLAss AcroNs-INDIREcr PuRcHAsERs
Historically, Canadian courts have refused to certify price-fixing class actions on behalf
of classes that include indirect purchasers on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to support a methodology for calculating harm on a class-wide
basis.24
Two decisions in 2009, Irving Paper Ltd. v. Atofina Chemicals Inc. ("Irving")25 and Pro-Sys
Consultants Ltd. v. Infineon Technologies AG ("Pro-Sys'), 26 marked a departure.from this
practice.
These class-certification decisions were upheld this year. The Irving and Pro-Sys de-
fendants sought leave to appeal the class certifications: Irving involved leave to appeal
from the Ontario Superior Court to the Ontario Divisional Court and Pro-Sys involved
leave to appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada. Both leave applications were denied, and both judgments were upheld. As a
result, the law in Ontario and British Columbia (two of the most significant provinces for
class actions in Canada) is that class certification should be granted to indirect purchaser
plaintiffs when the certification judge is satisfied that there is some basis in fact to find that
proof of aggregate damages on a class-wide basis is a common issue. This very low stan-
dard, if followed in other cases and provinces, could significantly lower the barriers to
competition class actions in Canada.
III. United States-Canada Trade Relations*
A. BORDER ISSUES
The United States and Canada continue to work towards a joint approach to border
security aimed at addressing common threats and promoting economic cooperation. Se-
nior government officials from both countries, including Attorney General Eric Holder,
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, Canadian Minister of Jus-
tice and Attorney General Rob Nicholson, and Canada's Minister of Public Safety Vic
22. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Reaches Agreement in Principle in Real Es-
tate Case (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03293.
html.
23. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Final Agreement Paves Way for More Competition in Canada's
Real Estate Market (Oct. 24, 2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
03305.html.
24. See, e.g., Chadha v. Bayer Inc., [2003] 223 D.L.R. 158 (Can.).
25. Irving Paper Ltd. v. Atofina Chems Inc., 47025 (2009] OJ. 4021 QUICKLAW (O.S.Cj. Sept. 28,
2009) (Can.).
26. Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Infineon Techs AG, CA036142 (Sup. Ct. British Columbia May 6, 2008)
(Can.), available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/08/05/2008BCSCO575errl.htm.
* Written by Marcela B. Stras, immediate past Co-Chair of ABA Canada Committee and member at
Cozen O'Connor.
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Toews, met on November 10, 2010 to continue the discussions during the eleventh
United States-Canada Cross-Border Crime Forum ("CBCF") Ministerial. 27
To better combat threats and transnational crime, the American and Canadian officials
discussed streamlining information sharing and enforcement efforts, as well as enhancing
the ability of both countries to identify and respond to a wide range of threats. During the
forum, officials underscored the importance of a shared vision for border security and
highlighted progress made by the United States and Canada over the past year to safe-
guard the critical resources, infrastructure, and citizens of both nations.
Both countries also "participated in the official signing ceremony of a Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU") for the Sharing of Currency Seizure Information ... [that] will
help identify potential threats and assist in money-laundering and terrorist-financing in-
vestigations."28 The MOU creates a "notification protocol for both countries when Cana-
dian and American border officers intercept more than $10,000."29 The next United
States-Canada Cross Border Crime Forum will be held in Ottawa, Ontario, in 2011.30
Earlier in the summer, the American and Canadian governments announced initiatives
aimed at promoting security and economic cooperation, including an agreement to com-
plete a joint threat and risk assessment addressing a wide range of border issues. The two
countries also agreed to draft the first comprehensive plan to protect critical infrastruc-
ture, such as electrical grids and tunnels.31 Both the United States and Canada have done
their own threat assessments involving the shared border, but, under the new agreement,
the two governments will conduct a joint threat assessment for the first time.
B. "Buy AMERICAN" AND OTHER "PROTECTIONIST" LEGISLATION
In February 2010, Canada and the United States reached an agreement that would al-
low Canadian companies to participate in American infrastructure projects financed under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ("Recovery Act"). Under the agreement,
Canadian suppliers will be provided access to state and local public works projects under
the Recovery Act in a range of areas, including programs of the U.S. Department of En-
ergy, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. These are areas of procurement where Canadian companies have tra-
ditionally been suppliers or sub-contractors in the United States.
The provinces and territories collaborated to develop an offer that enabled Canada to
reach this agreement with the United States by opening up their procurement markets.
Under the provisions of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Pro-
curement ("GPA"), Canada and the United States have agreed to offer each other perma-
27. The annual CBCF focuses on expanding cooperation on key cross-border crime and security issues
with a focus on cross-border investigations and prosecutions. The forum brings together senior public safety
and law enforcement officials and prosecutors to address cross-border issues, including terrorism, mass-mar-
keting fraud, interoperability, and organized crime.
28. Press Release, Public Safety Canada, Canada and the United States Meet to Discuss Cross-Border




31. Under the agreement to establish a critical infrastructure action plan, the countries will share informa-
tion, assess and manage risks, and increase the ability to prepare for and respond to disasters.
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nent market access at the sub-federal level. This means that Canadian suppliers will have
guaranteed access to U.S. sub-federal procurement, and American suppliers will have
guaranteed access to provincial procurement in accordance with undertakings under the
GPA.
Because some of the measures are temporary, Canada and the United States have
agreed to begin discussions within one year to explore the possibility of additional recipro-
cal access to procurement markets on a permanent basis. In this spirit, both countries also
have agreed to establish a fast-track consultation process should similar "Buy American"
provisions be applied to future funding programs.
Shortly after resolution of the "Buy American" problem, Canada became concerned by
what it viewed as new protectionist legislation: the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Account-
ability Act of 2010. The proposed legislation would require manufacturers sending goods
into the United States to have legal representation or business agents in the United States
in case there is a problem with the foreign products. The bill appears to be targeted at
Chinese products. The bill is meant to avoid instances like the situation that arose with
drywall from China, where homeowners in the United States were made ill from the dry-
wall but had no recourse against the manufacturer in China. 32 The bill is in committee at
present, with no action pending, although it does enjoy bipartisan support.
IV. Trade Controls*
A. INCREASED PROSECiTON Acrivrr
New activity in export control prosecutions over the past year indicates that the Canada
Border Services Agency ("CBSA") is continuing to pursue aggressive enforcement of trade
controls.
On May 29, 2010, CBSA charged Steven and Perienne de Jaray with exporting 5,100
controlled dual-use electronic chips to Hong Kong without a permit, contrary to the Ex-
port and Import Permits Act, and for failing to report the export contrary to the Customs
Act.
On July 6, 2010, Canada had its first successful prosecution under the Iran Sanctions
Regulations. The accused, Mahmoud Yadegari, had attempted to ship dual-use pressure
transducers to Iran through Dubai. These transducers could be used in heating and cool-
ing applications, as well as in centrifuges for enriching uranium. An Ontario provincial
court judge found that Yadegari "knew or . .. was willfully blind that the transducers had
32. By requiring foreign manufacturers to appoint registered agents, the bill, S. 1606, would significantly
lessen the burden upon U.S. litigants in connection with service of process. This requirement would obviate
the need for American litigants to utilize the Hague Convention to affect service upon entities domiciled in
foreign countries. However, S. 1606 would not violate the Hague Convention, because that treaty governs
only the service of process abroad within the territory of a foreign country, and not service (such as service
upon a registered agent) within the United States. In addition, S. 1606 specifically requires that a foreign
manufacturer's registered agent be located in a state in which the company has a "substantial connection to
the importation, distribution or sale of [its] products. . . ."
* Written by John W. Boscariol, immediate past Co-Chair of the ABA Canada Committee and Partner
and Leader of the International Trade and Investment Law Group at McCarthy Titrault LLP.
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the characteristics that made them restricted."33 Because Yadegari failed to apply for and
obtain the required permits, he was found guilty of violating the Sanctions Regulations
and other federal legislation, including the Export and Import Permits Act and the Cus-
toms Act. On July 29, 2010, he was sentenced to twenty months in jail in addition to
fifteen and one-half months of pre-sentence custody.
On November 10, 2010, in the first case of its kind involving Myanmar, CBSA charged
Kenn Borek Air and its former general manager for exporting a de Havilland DHC-6
Twin Otter airplane and 149 aircraft parts without valid export permits.
B. TARGET: IRAN
Canada enacted a number of additional sanctions measures against Iran this year. On
June 18, 2010, amendments to the Iran Sanctions Regulations came into force, imple-
menting United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 into Canadian law. The
amendments included the following:
* a prohibition on persons in Canada and Canadians outside Canada from making any
property or any financial or other related service available to Iran, persons in Iran,
or Iranian entities or their agents for the purpose of investing in commercial activity
in Canada involving uranium mining, production or use of specified nuclear materi-
als, and technology;
* the addition of a number of individuals and entities to the list of designated persons
subject to an assets freeze;
* the addition of materials, equipment, goods, and technology to the list of items that
are prohibited for export to Iran;
* a prohibition on providing any technology to Iran with respect to any activity re-
lated to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons; and
* a prohibition on the export to Iran of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles,
large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles,
or missile systems.3 4
Following similar actions taken by the United States and the European Union, Canada
enacted its own unilateral sanctions against Iran that add to the compliance burden of
Canadian companies doing business internationally, especially financial institutions and
firms operating in the oil and gas sectors.
The new measures, implemented under Canada's Special Economic Measures Act
("SEMA") on July 22, 2010, prohibit the following:
* making any new investment in the Iranian oil or gas sectors;
* providing to Iran items used in refining oil or liquefaction of gas;
* establishing correspondent banking relationships with Iranian financial institutions;
* providing or acquiring financial services to allow an Iranian financial institution (or
a branch, subsidiary, or office) to be established in Canada, or vice versa;
* purchasing any debt from the Government of Iran;
33. R. v. Mahmoud Yadegari, (O.C.J. July 6, 2010) (Can.), available at http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/YadegarLReasons.pdf.
34. Regulations Amending the Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Iran, SOR/
2010-154 (Can.).
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* dealing with listed designated persons involved in nuclear, chemical, biological, and
missile proliferation;
* providing to Iran arms and related material not already banned or items that could
contribute to Iran's proliferation activities; and
* providing a vessel owned or controlled by, or operating on behalf of, the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines with services for the vessel's operation or
maintenance. 35
C. SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS FOR FINANCIAL INSTTTITONS
Under Canadian sanctions legislation applicable to Iran and various other countries,
federally and provincially regulated financial institutions in Canada, including foreign
branches, are required to review their systems and records on a continuing basis to deter-
mine whether they are in possession or control of property of certain listed designated
persons, persons acting on behalf of designated persons, or persons owned or controlled
by them. Monthly reports as to whether such entities are in possession or control of this
property must be submitted to the applicable financial regulatory agency.
Accordingly the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions ("OSFI") re-
leased its Instruction Guide: Designated Persons Listings and Sanctions Laws onJune 14,
2010. It addresses the application of Canadian sanctions laws pertaining to Iran and other
countries and provides guidance on monthly reports, freezing and unfreezing assets, and
related issues for federally regulated financial institutions. 36
D. TENTATIVE STEPS ToWARD LIBERALIZING ENCRYPTION CONTROLS
Controls over the export or transfer of information security items and technology con-
tinue to present a challenge for many Canadian businesses. Failure to comply can have
substantial financial and reputational consequences. In many cases when product is de-
tained or seized by CBSA just prior to export because of compliance uncertainties, the
ensuing delays can strain customer relations and result in cancelled contracts and lost
business.
In response to significant concerns expressed by the Canadian business community re-
garding the effect of these controls on its competitive position in the international market-
place, this year the Export Controls Division of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada ("ECD") began consultations on cryptographic controls and means of facilitating
the permit process.
On October 19, 2010, ECD released new guidelines on its policies regarding the appli-
cation for and granting of permits for the export or transfer of cryptographic goods,
software, and technology 37 The guidelines identify several multi-destination permits now
available to exporters of cryptographic items. These permits enable exporters to ship or
35. Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SOR/2010-165 (Can.).
36. John Boscariol, Sanctions Alert: The Brave New World of Doing Business With Iran, McCARTHY TP-
TRAULT, July 12, 2010, http://www.mccarthy.ca/article-detail.aspx?id=5064.
37. Erport Permits for CryptographicItems, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE CAN., Oct. 28, 2010, http:/
/www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/export-exportation/crypto/CryptoIntro.aspx?lang-eng.
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transfer items to consignees in multiple countries with flexible terms and conditions, and
they include the following permits:
* a "broad-based permit" for exports of hardware, executable software, and associated
information and enhancements, to a wide range of countries;
* a "co-development permit" for exports of controlled software, source code, and
other technology containing cryptographic functionality and related technical data
and assistance for product development, to affiliates in a wide range of countries;
* a "bona fide Canadian and American corporations permit" for exports of hardware,
executable software, and associated information and enhancements, to foreign con-
signees that are majority-owned by Canadian- or American-based parent companies;
* a "regime decontrol (ancillary cryptography) permit" for exports of any goods or
technology that meet the definition of "ancillary" cryptography;
* a "java permit" for exports of hardware and executable software into which the Java
Runtime Environment has been integrated, and associated information and en-
hancements, to a wide range of countries; and
* a "financial institutions permit" for exports of hardware, executable software, and
associated information and enhancements, to financial institutions in a number of
countries that have enacted legislation to counter money laundering.38
ECD states that that any exporter seeking to rely on these more flexible multi-destina-
tion permits must have a comprehensive export compliance plan in place, including proce-
dures that "ensure employees at all levels of a company understand and act in accordance
with the letter and spirit of" Canada's trade controls.39
E. OTHER LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
OnJune 19, 2010, ECD announced its proposal to amend item 5500 (Goods and Tech-
nology for Certain Uses) of the schedule to the Export Control List.40 This is a "catch-
all" control designed to cover unlisted goods and technology that could be used in the
development or production of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The proposed
amendment provides that an exporter is required to submit an application only if the
item's properties (i.e., technical characteristics or capabilities) and any other information
made known to the exporter would lead a reasonable person to suspect that it would be
used in the specified proliferation contexts. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is designated
as the person responsible for making determinations that an item meets the criteria appli-
cable to these catchall controls. The list of exempt destination countries also is reduced to
those that participate in certain multilateral export control regimes. The amendment ex-
pands the list of weapons subject to control to include nuclear explosive and radiological
dispersal devices.
On July 13, 2010, in response to North Korea's sinking of the South Korean naval
vessel Cheonan, Canada added North Korea to its Area Control List ("ACL"), which
identifies those countries to which exports and transfers of all goods and technology are
prohibited without a permit.4 1 Belarus and Burma are the only other countries now on
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Order Amending the Export Control List, Pt. I, 144 C. Gaz. 25 (2010) (Can.).
41. Order Amending the Area Control List, C. Gaz., Pt II, 144 C. Gaz. 16 (2010) (Can.).
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the ACL. In October, Canada announced that it also would be implementing additional
import, export, and investment sanctions against North Korea under the Special Eco-
nomic Measures Act.
As of December 2010, transactions involving any of the following countries should be
red-flagged and carefully screened for compliance with Canadian trade controls: Belarus,
Burma, Iran, Lebanon, Cuba, Syria, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Eritrea, Guinea, Iraq, Liberia, North Korea, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe.
V. Innigration*
A number of significant developments took place in 2010 in Canadian Immigration law
and policy. The most important are outlined below.
A. TIuvIPORARY FoREIGN WORKER PROGRAM
Citizenship and Immigration Canada introduced a number of changes to take effect on
April 1, 2011 with respect to the hiring of temporary workers, including:
[A] more rigorous assessment of the genuineness of the job offer; a two-year prohibi-
tion from hiring temporary foreign workers for employers who fail to meet their
commitments to workers with respect to wages, working conditions, and occupation;
and a limit on the length of time a temporary foreign worker may work in Canada
before returning home.
Employers seeking to hire temporary foreign workers, including live-in caregivers,
will now be assessed against past compliance with program requirements before au-
thorization can be granted. Employers found to have violated worker rights may be
refused authorization to hire a foreign worker.
In cases in which employers have not met their previous commitments to workers,
they may be denied access to the temporary foreign worker program for two years.
Offending employers' names also would be published on the Citizenship and Immi-
gration Canada website to inform other temporary foreign workers already in Ca-
nada. Employers will be given the opportunity to explain the circumstances before
any such action is taken against them.
A four-year cumulative limit also is being imposed on many temporary foreign work-
ers' employment in Canada. After a four-year work term, they will now have to wait
four years before becoming eligible to again work temporarily in Canada. The limit
does not affect eligibility for permanent residents or foreign workers admitted to
Canada under NAFTA or other international agreements.
* Written by Sergio R. Karas, a certified specialist in Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Law, Vice-
Chair, ABA Canada Committee and member of Karas & Associates.
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These changes are intended to provide more certainty to employers and employees
concerning the duration of work permits and the rights and duties of both employers
and employees in connection with the hiring of temporary workers.42
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY WORKERS
As of October 1, 2010, the Information Technology Workers Program has been discon-
tinued and foreign workers who intend to qualify in that category will have to obtain a
positive Labor Market Opinion. Because of this change, employers who wish to hire tem-
porary foreign workers previously eligible for facilitated processing are now required to
apply for a Labor Market Opinion.
C. FEDERAL SKILLED WORKER PROGRAM
On June 26, 2010, Citizenship and Immigration Canada announced a number of mea-
sures primarily designed to control the number of applications in its large inventory and
to reduce pressures on processing capacity. In addition, changing economic conditions
and a more difficult labor market have resulted in declining incomes for new immigrants
and difficulties in securing appropriate employment. The government reduced the num-
ber of eligible occupations in the Federal Skilled Worker category from thirty-eight occu-
pational titles in the National Occupational Classification ("NOC") to twenty-nine
occupational titles in that list, making some substitutions and important deletions. The
government also imposed a maximum global annual cap of 20,000 applications of which
up to 1,000 applicants per occupation will be allowed. It is expected that the government
will devise a system to notify the public in advance as to when the maximum number of
applications for a particular occupation is about to be reached.
D. LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS
Citizen and Immigration Canada has said that "under changes to the Federal Skilled
Worker program and the Canadian Experience Class, all new applicants are required to
include the results of an English or French language test."43 The language testing re-
quirements include native speakers of English or French. In the past, "applicants had the
option of either proving their language ability through a language test or written submis-
sion. The written submission was intended for people whose first language is English or
French" or for those people who have completed a significant portion of their education,
particularly higher education, in either language.44 This option is no longer available.
The imposition of uniform language testing for native English or French speakers has
resulted in public backlash, as it appears to be an unnecessary requirement for those who
speak one of Canada's official languages, but the government contended that devising a
mechanism to separate immigration applicants based on language was impractical.
42. Improvements to the Temporary Foreign Worker Program, CrnZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, Aug.
8, 2010, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/DEPARTMENT/media/backgrounders/2010/2010-08-18.asp.
43. Changes to Proof of Language Requirements Will Help Better Position Newcomers to Adapt to Canada's Labour
Market, CrnZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, June 26, 2010, http-/www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/
media/backgrounders/2010/2010-06-26a.asp.
44. Id.
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E. INVESTORS
Canada's Immigrant Investor Program was designed to attract experienced businesspe-
ople who bring significant economic benefits to Canada and who invest considerable capi-
tal in immigrant investor funds. In recent years, the financial requirements imposed by
immigration authorities in this particular application category have fallen behind those set
out by other countries in their own immigrant investor programs. On June 26, 2010, the
government announced changes that include new eligibility criteria for applicants who
submit applications after the date of the announcement. The changes require new inves-
tors to have a personal net worth of C$1.6 million, up from C$800,000, and to make an
investment of C$800,000, up from C$400,000. According to the government, higher in-
vestment amounts means that provinces and territories will receive a greater amount of
capital to put toward economic development within their regions, and "higher personal
net worth criteria mean that the program can attract investors with valuable global busi-
ness links and the resources to make secondary investments into the Canadian econ-
omy."45 The government continues to argue that the changes compare favorably with
immigrant investor programs administered by other countries that require much higher
minimum investments and higher net worth.
In addition to the changes, because of an increase in inventory, the government de-
clared an "administrative pause" to manage the application intake. The government did
not announce any measures to address the slow processing times in the Federal Investor
Program or persistent concerns over the screening of individuals who have potentially
obtained their net worth through questionable activities. (Over the years, individuals
from emerging markets who cannot provide appropriate documentation to justify their
wealth or who have ties to criminal organizations have begun to focus their attention on
Canada's Investor Program.)
F. LivE-ni CAREGIVER PROGRAM
The Live-In Caregiver Program brings to Canada thousands of caregivers who care for
young children or the elderly in family homes. Most applicants come from the Philip-
pines. A number of regulatory and administrative changes were proposed in December
2009 to improve worker protections and to make a transition to permanent residence
easier.
The amendments to the regulations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
include the following points:
* The time in which caregivers can complete their two years of work to qualify for
permanent residence has been expanded. Caregivers now have four years to meet
the requirements instead of three.
* There is a more flexible assessment of work requirements. Caregivers who work
overtime may apply for permanent residence sooner. They may now become eligi-
ble after 3,900 hours over a minimum of twenty-two months, with a maximum of
390 overtime hours, or two years at regular full-time rates.
45. News Release, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Re-Opens Immigrant Investor Program
(Nov. 10, 2010), available at http://www.cic.gc.calenglish/department/media/releases/2010/2010-11-10a.asp.
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* The uncertainty faced by caregivers has been reduced because of the elimination of
a second medical examination that had been administered after the completion of
two years of employment. Some caregivers have been denied permanent residence
on the ground that an illness was discovered in a standard second medical examina-
tion after a caregiver had completed the requirements of the program. Citizenship
and Immigration Canada now has the authority to assess medical admissibility in an
application for permanent residence based on the medical examination administered
before coming to Canada as a temporary resident.46
At the same time, a number of administrative changes were announced:
First, employment contracts must now address employer-paid benefits; accommoda-
tions; duties; hours of work, including overtime hours; wages; holiday and sick leave
entitlements; and terms of termination or resignation. Second, new employer-paid
benefits now include transportation to the place of work in Canada from the live-in
caregiver's country of residence, private medical insurance before activation of pro-
vincial health coverage, workplace safety insurance or equivalent insurance if the for-
mer is unavailable, and all recruitment fees associated with hiring a live-in caregiver.
Third, there is emergency processing of labor market opinions and work permits for
caregivers already in Canada who face abuse, intimidation, or threats in their current
jobs. Fourth, there is a new caregiver telephone service offered through the CIC Call
Centre that informs employers and caregivers living in Canada of their rights and
responsibilities under the program.47
46. Improvements to the Live-In Caregiver Program, CrrlZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, Aug. 18,
2010, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/DEPARTMENT/media/backgrounders/2010/2010-08-18a.asp.
47. Id.
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